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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Adrian Harthcock appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his post-conviction petition.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
After a jury convicted Harthcock of two counts of lewd conduct, the district
court imposed consecutive unified life sentences, with 10 years fixed.

(R.,

pp.534, 703.) Harthcock filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, requesting a reduction of his
sentence, which the district court denied. (R., p.534.) Harthcock appealed the
denial of his Rule 35 motion, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. (R.,
p.534.)
Harthcock filed a timely 129-page pro se petition for post-conviction relief
asserting several claims, which he broadly categorized as judicial error,
prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.5-134.)
Harthcock also attached over 300 pages of “exhibits” to his petition. (R., pp.135446.) In addition, Harthcock filed numerous other documents, including a motion
for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp.447-509.)
The district court granted Harthcock’s request for counsel and filed a
notice of intent to dismiss Harthcock’s petition.

(R., pp.516-517, 703-723.)

Harthcock subsequently filed a “Motion for Replacement of Counsel.”
pp.734-737.)

(R.,

The court denied Harthcock’s request for new post-conviction

counsel and allowed appointed counsel to withdraw after counsel advised the
court that he could not find a meritorious issue to raise in post-conviction. (Tr.,
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p.14, L.5 – p.18, L.2; R., pp.790-791.) In addition to advising Harthcock of its
reasons for dismissal in its notice of intent to dismiss, at a hearing held after the
notice was issued, the district court also explained its reasons for rejecting
additional claims Harthcock wanted post-conviction counsel to raise and gave
Harthcock 30 days to respond to the court’s notice. (Tr., p.18, L.8 – p.19, L.19,
p.23, Ls.19-23.) The court entered an order dismissing Harthcock’s petition 32
days later. (R., pp.793-796.)
Harthcock filed a request for “rereview” of his petition (R., pp.800-802),
after which the court entered an amended order dismissing Harthcock’s petition
(R., pp.807-810), and a Final Judgment, dismissing Harthcock’s petition with
prejudice (R., p.812). Harthcock filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to the
prison mailbox rule. (R., pp.814-817; Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal;
Response to Conditional Dismissal; Order to Withdraw Conditional Dismissal.)
Although the district court granted Harthcock’s request to appoint counsel
to represent him on appeal (R., pp.833-834), appellate counsel was allowed to
withdraw after notifying the Court that Harthcock instructed her that he wished to
proceed pro se.

(Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record and to Allow

Appellant to Proceed Pro Se; Affidavit in Support of Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel of Record and to Allow Appellant to Proceed Pro Se; Order Granting
Motion for Leave to Withdraw and Suspend the Briefing Schedule.)
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ISSUES
Due to its length, Harthcock’s statement of the issues on appeal is not
reproduced here, but may be found on page five of the Appellant’s Brief. The
state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Harthcock failed to meet his burden of showing error in relation to the
district court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition?
2.
Has Harthcock failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to amend?
3.
Has Harthcock failed to show error in the denial of his request for
discovery?
4.
Because there is no adverse ruling by the district court in relation to
Harthcock’s motion to suppress, should this Court decline to consider
Harthcock’s claim that the district court erred in not granting his motion?
Alternatively, has Harthcock failed to identify any legal entitlement in his postconviction case to “suppression” of evaluations conducted and considered in his
underlying criminal case?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Harthcock Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal
Decision
A.

Introduction
The district court summarily dismissed Harthcock’s post-conviction petition

after giving Harthcock notice of its intent to do so. (R., pp.703-723, 793-796,
807-810.) The grounds for dismissal included that (1) many of the claims could
have been raised on direct appeal and were, therefore, barred from
consideration in post-conviction pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901; and (2) the
remaining claims were unsupported by the record or otherwise lacked merit. (R.,
pp.715-723.)

On appeal, Harthcock disagrees with the district court’s

interpretation of I.C. § 19-4901, claiming that the statute affords post-conviction
petitioners discretion and does not “obligate him” to raise issues on direct
appeal. (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) Harthcock also generally asserts the grounds
for dismissal set forth in the court’s notice of intent to dismiss are “clearly
erroneous.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.13.) Application of the correct legal standards
to the allegations in Harthcock’s petition shows the district court did not err in its
summary dismissal decision.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
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affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).
C.

Harthcock Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Summary Dismissal Of
His Petition
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for

post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative. “Although [the court is] required to treat the applicant's uncontroverted
allegations as true, [it is] not required to accept his legal and factual
conclusions.” Bure v. State, 126 Idaho 253, 254, 880 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Ct. App.
1994) (citing Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985)). “To
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90
P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833
(2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal
“if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each
element of the petitioner’s claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164
P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72,
90 P.3d at 297. In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989).
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Although Harthcock has filed an 82-page brief on appeal, he provides no
pertinent argument explaining how the district court actually erred in dismissing
his petition. Instead, Harthcock claims I.C. § 19-4901 did not preclude him from
raising any claims in post-conviction, regardless of whether he could have raised
them on direct appeal, and generally and repeatedly asserts the district court’s
notice of intent to dismiss was “clearly erroneous.” (See generally Appellant’s
Brief.) There is no merit to any of Harthcock’s arguments.
“The scope of post-conviction relief is limited.” Rodgers v. State, 129
Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348, 353 (1997). The remedy available under the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPCPA”) “is not a substitute for nor
does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an
appeal from the sentence or conviction.” I.C. § 19-4901(b); accord Rodgers, 129
Idaho at 725, 932 P.2d at 353 (“An application for post-conviction relief is not a
substitute for an appeal.”). Thus, any “issue which could have been raised on
direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in postconviction proceedings” except upon a “substantial factual showing” by
admissible evidence “that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt
about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due
diligence, have been presented earlier.” I.C. § 19-4901(b) (emphasis added).
The district court dismissed Harthcock’s substantive judicial error and
prosecutorial misconduct claims, and his claim that counsel had a conflict of
interest, because those claims could have been raised on direct appeal. (R.,
pp.715-716.) Harthcock contends the district court erred in this regard, arguing
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that a “a claim/issue that may be raised on direct appeal is not obligated to be
raised on direct appeal as opposed to reserving [the] claim for post-conviction
relief petitioning [sic].”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.12 (emphasis original).)

This

argument is contrary to law. By their nature, claims of judicial and prosecutorial
misconduct and alleged conflicts of interest occurring at trial are claims known to
a defendant both at the time of trial and on direct appeal. Accordingly, Idaho’s
appellate courts have consistently applied the procedural bar of I.C. § 19-4901(b)
and held that claims of this nature, even if not raised in the trial court or on direct
appeal, are not cognizable in post-conviction proceedings. See, e.g., Rodgers,
129 Idaho at 725, 932 P.2d at 353; Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 475, 224
P.3d 536, 542 (Ct. App. 2009).1 Harthcock’s argument that compliance with I.C.
§ 19-4901 is optional is without merit.
The district court dismissed Harthcock’s remaining post-conviction claims,
which allege ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, because the
claims were either disproven by the record or failed to allege a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to deficient performance and prejudice. (R., pp.716723.) In relation to the dismissal of these claims, Harthcock often ignores what
the district court actually stated in its notice of intent to dismiss, and instead

1

While independent claims of prosecutorial misconduct are generally barred in
post-conviction proceedings, a post-conviction petitioner whose trial attorney did
not raise the alleged misconduct in the underlying criminal case may
nevertheless pursue the issue in the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Barcella, 148 Idaho at 475, 224 P.3d at 542. To the extent
Harthcock raised his substantive misconduct claims as ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, for the reasons discussed infra, those claims were also properly
dismissed.
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generally and repeatedly asserts the district court’s decision was “clearly
erroneous” and then “supports” this general and repeated assertion by citing
some applicable legal standards and listing numerous case citations without ever
explaining the applicability or relevance of the cited cases. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.13-16 (including “footnotes” with lengthy string cites), 18-21, 22-25 (includes
two lengthy string cites), 26-41, 44 (page of case citations).)

To the extent

Harthcock’s brief lacks relevant legal argument, this Court should decline to
consider his claims of error. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d
709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970
(1996)) (noting an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is
lacking” and declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to
“provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to support his argument”).
Consideration of the reasons the district court actually dismissed Harthcock’s
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims shows no error. The
state adopts those reasons, as articulated in the district court’s notice of intent to
dismiss (R., pp.713-723), as its argument on appeal.
What is abundantly clear from the record is that Harthcock erroneously
believes his many post-conviction claims have merit despite the contrary
conclusion reached by post-conviction counsel and the district court, and the
implicit contrary determination made by trial counsel and post-conviction
appellate counsel who declined to pursue Harthcock’s proffered claims. The
facts and the law support the conclusion that Harthcock’s claims lack merit and
his petition was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. Harthcock

8

has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the summary dismissal of his
post-conviction petition.

2

II.
Harthcock Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying His Motion To Amend
A.

Introduction
Harthcock contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to amend his post-conviction petition.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.50-60.)

Harthcock’s claim fails. Application of the correct legal standards to Harthcock’s
verbal motion to amend shows the court reasonably exercised its discretion in
denying Harthcock’s request to amend because amendment would have been
futile.

2

Harthcock also complains that the district court applied an incorrect standard of
review to his petition. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.68-78.) This argument appears to
be based on the court telling him that his allegations would have to meet the
same standards applied to attorneys, and the court’s alleged failure to construe
uncontroverted facts in his favor. (See generally id.) As to the first complaint,
when the court allowed post-conviction counsel to withdraw, it did advise
Harthcock that he would be “held to the standards of an attorney.” (Tr., p.21,
Ls.18-19.) Because this statement is legally accurate, it cannot support a claim
of error. Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046
(2003) (citing Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 797 P.2d 95 (1990)) (“Pro se
litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an
attorney.”). As to Harthcock’s second complaint, he is correct that, in the context
of summary dismissal, the district court must accept the uncontroverted
allegations as true. Bure, 126 Idaho at 254, 880 P.2d at 1242. However, the
court was not required to accept Harthcock’s legal and factual conclusions. Id.
Harthcock’s argument ignores the limitation on the principle on which his
argument is based, and it is apparent from his complaints that he believes the
district court erred by not accepting his legal and factual conclusions, including
those that were disproven by the underlying criminal record.
9

B.

Standard Of Review
Post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000); thus, a
motion to amend a post-conviction petition is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a).
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a), “a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.” The decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 610, 570
P.2d 284, 288 (1977).
In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the district court (1) perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable
legal standards; and (3) exercised reason in reaching its decision.

State v.

Taylor, 157 Idaho 186, 194, 335 P.3d 31, 39 (2014) (quoting State v. Cantu, 129
Idaho 673, 674, 931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Harthcock’s
Motion To Amend
Although motions to amend should be liberally granted, “[i]f the amended

pleading does not set out a valid claim . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint.”

Taylor v.

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 847, 243 P.3d 642, 663 (2010) (quoting Black
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 175,
804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991)). In other words, the district court does not abuse its
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discretion by denying a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile.
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 237, 61 P.3d 585, 594 (2002) (citation
omitted).
Harthcock never filed a written motion to amend. Instead, in his “Motion
for Replacement Counsel,” Harthcock indicated that he told appointed postconviction counsel “to file a[n] amended petition . . . or a supplemental petition . .
. to add the supporting factors [sic] etc for each claim and bring up other claims,”
but counsel declined to do so. (R., p.735.) In that same motion, Harthcock
further asserted “counsel has not raised claims obvious to counsel” such as
“ineffective assistance of appellate counsel” for those claims that the district
court indicated would be dismissed because they should have been raised on
direct appeal.

(R., p.736.)

Harthcock also filed a second “Motion for

Replacement Counsel” in which he complained about an alleged lack of
communication with post-conviction counsel and again indicated that he wanted
additional claims raised in an amended petition, including ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel as well as a claim based on the Idaho public defender
system not meeting “constitutional standards.” (R., pp.772-778.)
At the hearing on Harthcock’s motions for “replacement counsel,” the
district court inquired of Harthcock regarding his desire to file an amended
petition to include additional ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims
and an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on alleged defects in
the public defender system. (Tr., p.12, L.6 – p.14, L.4.) Post-conviction counsel
advised the court that he reviewed those issues with Harthcock, and he reviewed
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all of the documents Harthcock had submitted, and concluded there were no
viable post-conviction claims to pursue on Harthcock’s behalf. (Tr., p.14, L.5 –
p.17, L.14.) For that reason, the district court allowed post-conviction counsel to
withdraw. (Tr., p.17, L.10 – p.18, L.2.) The court then explained why it would
not allow Harthcock to amend his petition with the additional claims he outlined
at the hearing:
Now, we’ve addressed the issue of the ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel in the notice of intent to dismiss, but I can
certainly revisit that. If there was not an objection made, it is not an
issue that can be raised on appeal. Moreover, you do not have a
right to have each and every issue raised on appeal. In fact, your
appellate counsel is tasked with the obligation of determining which
issues to present on appeal and which issues not to raise.
Because you cannot show that any of these issues would
have been -- would have been won on appeal, you haven’t really
alleged any prejudice. Therefore, the Court cannot find that there
is ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for [not] raising the
judicial -- your claims of judicial error. In terms of raising the claim
of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court noted in its notice of intent
to dismiss that it did not find any instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, and so therefore failure to raise that on appeal could
not be either deficient performance or would you have established
any prejudice.
As it relates to your claim of the public defender system not
meeting constitutional standards, you have not alleged or
specifically shown that Mr. Grove specifically had a -- had an
unduly burdensome caseload, and/or that he was unable to
adequately represent you. So it’s not enough to just allege the
system was problematic. You have to specifically allege and
support that claim with admissible evidence that something about
Mr. Grove’s caseload made it so that he could not support or
adequately represent you.
(Tr., p.18, L.8 – p.19, L.16.)
The court thereafter entered a written “Order Denying Motion to Amend
Petition for Post Conviction Relief” reiterating that the claims Harthcock wanted
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to include in an amended petition “have no merit,” and stating: “Petitioner has
asserted numerous claims in his Petition, none of which have any merit as
pleaded and many are frivolous, having absolutely no legal or factual basis.
Adding more frivolous claims will not serve the underlying purpose of postconviction proceedings.” (R., pp.787-788.)
Harthcock argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to amend, but he does not cite any relevant legal standards governing
requests to amend. (See generally R., pp.50-60.) The Court should, therefore,
decline to consider Harthcock’s claim that the district court erred in denying his
request.

Murray, 156 Idaho at 168, 321 P.3d at 718.

Even if considered,

Harthcock has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision.
The standards set forth in Strickland, supra, govern ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel claims. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). The relevant
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
Harthcock would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285
(2000). The district court correctly concluded that amendment would be futile
because appellate counsel was not required to raise judicial and prosecutorial
misconduct claims that lacked merit. (Tr., p.18, L.18 – p.19, L.5.) Harthcock has
failed to identify any legal or factual error in this conclusion.
The district court also correctly concluded that Harthcock cannot establish
ineffective assistance of trial counsel by alleging general deficiencies in the
public defender system.

Rather, Strickland requires a showing of deficient

performance and prejudice by trial counsel who actually represented Harthcock.
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Having failed to identify any specific error in the context of his request to amend,
Harthcock cannot demonstrate error in the district court’s decision declining his
motion to amend to add a claim that was not based on any specific deficiency by
trial counsel.
Because Harthcock has failed to show error under the applicable legal
standards, he has not established any abuse of discretion in the denial of his oral
motion to amend.
III.
Harthcock Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Discovery Request
A.

Introduction
In conjunction with his post-conviction petition, Harthcock filed a motion

for “pre-discovery,” requesting copies of (1) his presentence investigation report;
(2) his psychosexual evaluation; (3) “[a]ll letters” he wrote to his appellate
attorney; (4) all of his appellate attorney’s “notes . . . on this case”; and (5) the
transcript of the sentencing hearing held on June 4, 2012. (R., pp.457-458.) Of
these requests, the only one Harthcock pursued was the sentencing transcript.
(See Tr., p.29, L.1 – p.30, L.10.) The district court denied Harthcock’s request
for this transcript, concluding it was not relevant. (Tr., p.31, Ls.7-10.) Harthcock
claims the court erred, arguing his discovery request was necessary to
“discover/investigate undiscovered claims.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.68.) A review of
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the record and the applicable legal standards shows no error in the court’s denial
of Harthcock’s request for a copy of an irrelevant sentencing transcript.
B.

3

Standard Of Review
Whether to authorize discovery is a matter directed to the discretion of the

trial court. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing I.C.R. 57(b); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d
749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999); Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 319, 912 P.2d 679,
687 (Ct. App. 1996)).
C.

Harthcock Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Discovery
Request
“The district court is not required to order discovery ‘unless necessary to

protect an applicant's substantial rights.’” Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139 P.3d at
750 (quoting Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 375, 825 P.2d 94, 98 (Ct. App.
1992)).

“’Fishing expedition’ discovery should not be allowed” because the

Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act “provides a forum for known grievances,
not an opportunity to research for grievances.” Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139
P.3d at 750 (citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108,
1112 (2004)).

3

To the extent Harthcock is complaining that he did not receive the other
documents listed in his motion for “pre-discovery,” he did not pursue those
requests and, as such, there is no adverse ruling to review on appeal. State v.
Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420, 272 P.3d 382, 392 (2012) (declining to review
an issue where there was no adverse ruling by the district court).

15

Harthcock stated the purpose of his initial request for discovery was to
“aid in post conviction briefing.” (R., p.458.) At the hearing where Harthcock
pursued his request, he explained he wanted the transcript from his “first
4
sentencing,” which was held on June 4, 2012 , in order to extract a precise quote

from the transcript, which does not appear in the minutes of that hearing. (Tr.,
p.30, Ls.3-10.) In response, the court asked Harthcock: “Why is what happened
at that initial sentencing relevant to what happened at the trial and subsequent
sentencing?” (Tr., p.30, Ls.19-21.) Harthcock responded that it was relevant to
his claim that his sentence was “predetermined.” (Tr., p.30, L.22 – p.31, L.6.)
The court denied Harthcock’s request for the transcript, concluding it was not
“relevant to what occurred at the sentencing after [Harthcock’s] trial.” (Tr., p.31,
Ls.8-10.)
On appeal, Harthcock does not explain why the district court’s relevance
determination was erroneous. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.67-68.) Rather, Harthcock
argues the requested discovery “would have been mediums [sic] . . . to
discover/investigate undiscovered claims.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.68.)

To the

extent his argument is unresponsive to the actual ruling by the district court, this

4

The Register of Actions from Harthcock’s underlying criminal case reflects that
Harthcock originally pled guilty pursuant to a Rule 11 plea agreement and was
sentenced on June 4, 2012. (R., p.698.) Harthcock, however, moved to
withdraw his guilty plea four days later; that motion was granted, and Harthcock
proceeded to trial at which he was convicted. (R., pp.698-699.) Given this
course of proceedings, it appears that a transcript of the June 4, 2012
sentencing hearing was not prepared in conjunction with Harthcock’s direct
appeal, which is presumably the reason the district court’s Order Taking Judicial
Notice includes the court minutes of the June 4, 2012 hearing, as opposed to the
transcript of that hearing. (R., p.531.)
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Court may affirm on the unchallenged basis that the transcript was not relevant.
State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998)
(where a basis for a ruling by a district court is unchallenged on appeal, appellate
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis). Even if Harthcock’s argument is
considered, it is, on its face, a request for discovery that is tantamount to a
fishing expedition. Because discovery requests of this nature are not allowed in
post-conviction, Harthcock’s claim of error fails. Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 139
P.3d at 750.
Harthcock has failed to show error in the denial of his discovery request.
IV.
Harthcock Has Failed To Identify Any Adverse Ruling In Relation To His
Suppression Motion Or Any Legal Basis For His Motion
Finally, Harthcock complains that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.60-66.) Because the district court did
not address Harthcock’s motion to suppress, there is no adverse ruling for this
Court to review. Alternatively, this claim has no legal basis.
Harthcock accompanied his post-conviction petition with a motion to
suppress in which he sought suppression of the evaluations prepared for
sentencing in his underlying criminal case, including the social/sexual
assessment, the mental health evaluation, and the psychosexual evaluation.
(R., pp.447-452.)

Although the district court never addressed Harthcock’s

request for suppression, Harthcock claims the court erred in not granting the
motion. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.62-66.) This Court should decline to consider this
claim of error because there is no adverse ruling by the district court for this
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Court to review. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420, 272 P.3d 382, 392
(2012) (declining to review an issue where there was no adverse ruling by the
district court).
Even if considered, Harthcock’s claim is meritless. Harthcock has cited
no legal basis that would support his argument that he may pursue a motion to
suppress in a post-conviction case for evaluations prepared in relation to his
underlying criminal case.

(See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.60-66.) While

Harthcock could claim counsel was ineffective in relation to the preparation or
use of such evaluations, he may not seek “suppression” of the evaluations. Any
claim to the contrary is legally without merit.
Harthcock has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the summary
dismissal of his petition or the denial of any of his motions.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the district court’s order dismissing Harthcock’s petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 27th day of May, 2016.
_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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